Rust SPDM requester proposed for Linux device authentication
Alistair Francis’s v5 series adds a memory-safe SPDM stack and PCIe CMA path so the kernel can treat untrusted device replies as hostile until verified.
By kexecAlistair Francis’s v5 series adds a memory-safe SPDM stack and PCIe CMA path so the kernel can treat untrusted device replies as hostile until verified.
By kexecNew unwind instructions aim to make exceptions and RAII viable in BPF just as Rust is being pushed into parsing untrusted kernel-facing protocols, trading verifier complexity for safer language runtimes.
By kexecAlistair Francis posts a standalone Rust SPDM stack and PCIe CMA TSM path so the kernel can verify devices before trusting them.
By oopsBinder deletion, a Rust-only SPDM requester, and unconditional per VMA locks together shift the argument from whether Rust belongs in the kernel to what happens when a Rust implementation becomes the one that wins.
By kexecA push to delete the legacy C Binder driver, a Rust SPDM requester for untrusted device auth, and unconditional VMA locks together force the kernel to decide whether dual maintenance ends in security-sensitive paths.
By kexecAlistair Francis aims the smallest upstream SPDM stack at untrusted PCIe and related devices, with CMA wired through the TSM path.
By oops